The first count of a federal indictment in Cincinnati charged that, on or about August 14, 1917, a man named Ferger forged a bill of lading, a railroad's own receipt promising it has taken specific goods into its care for shipment, for corn supposedly moving from Fountaintown, Indiana, to Cincinnati on the Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railway. No corn had moved. No shipper or consignee for it had ever existed. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, both sides agreed on that much: the document was invented from its first word, printed to look exactly like the real bills the railway issued every day.

The indictment said the scheme worked because a bill of lading is also money. A bank holding one as collateral trusts that the cargo it describes is real and already in a carrier's custody; it lends against the shipment, not the borrower's word alone. A second count charged that Ferger used that same forged bill to obtain a loan from the Second National Bank of Cincinnati, and that he and his partners repeated the whole move, forgery and loan together, eleven more times. That pairing, one count for the forging and one for the loan, is how a single scheme produced twenty-four counts.

The charge rested on a federal law passed the year before, "An Act Relating to bills of lading in interstate and foreign commerce," which made forging such a document a federal crime. Ferger's lawyers argued that the stipulation cut the other way: if the government itself admitted there was no real shipper, consignee, or shipment, then there was no actual interstate commerce in the paper for Congress's commerce power to reach. A federal district court in Ohio agreed and dismissed all twenty-four counts, reasoning that a fraud about cargo that was never going anywhere was the state's business, not the nation's.

The Supreme Court reversed on June 2, 1919, and sent the case back for trial; the appeal had tested only Congress's constitutional power to punish such a scheme, not whether the defendants were guilty of it. Chief Justice White, writing for the Court, held that Congress's power over interstate commerce reaches the documents commerce runs on, genuine and counterfeit alike, because the two cannot be regulated apart. The nation's trade credit, the Court wrote, rests on that same genuineness and the faith placed in it. A forged bill left unpunished does not only cheat the bank that accepted it. It weakens the trust every bank extends to the next bill on its desk, real or not.

Ferger's defense treated the missing corn as the whole case: nothing real had moved, so nothing real had been harmed. The Court's answer was that the harmed thing was credit itself. Money changes hands today on a signature or a stamp asserting that something true happened somewhere else, and the moment that assertion can be false without cost, every other assertion like it is worth a little less, whether or not a single transaction can point to a victim.

No corn ever left Fountaintown. The charge was that real money moved anyway, on the strength of a sentence that was not true, and Congress had already decided a nation's credit could not be built on sentences like that.